Efficient, Scalable, and Resilient Vehicle-Centric Certificate
  Revocation List Distribution in VANETs by Khodaei, Mohammad & Papadimitratos, Panos
ar
X
iv
:1
80
7.
02
70
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  7
 Ju
l 2
01
8
Efficient, Scalable, and Resilient Vehicle-Centric
Certificate Revocation List Distribution in VANETs
Mohammad Khodaei
Networked Systems Security Group
Stockholm, Sweden
khodaei@kth.se
Panos Papadimitratos
Networked Systems Security Group
Stockholm, Sweden
papadim@kth.se
ABSTRACT
In spite of progress in securing Vehicular Communication (VC)
systems, there is no consensus on how to distribute Certificate Re-
vocation Lists (CRLs). Themain challenges lie exactly in (i) crafting
an efficient and timely distribution of CRLs for numerous anony-
mous credentials, pseudonyms, (ii) maintaining strong privacy for
vehicles prior to revocation events, even with honest-but-curious
system entities, (iii) and catering to computation and communica-
tion constraints of on-board units with intermittent connectivity
to the infrastructure. Relying on peers to distribute the CRLs is
a double-edged sword: abusive peers could ‘‘pollute’’ the process,
thus degrading the timely CRLs distribution. In this paper, we pro-
pose a vehicle-centric solution that addresses all these challenges
and thus closes a gap in the literature. Our scheme radically re-
duces CRL distribution overhead: each vehicle receives CRLs cor-
responding only to its region of operation and its actual trip du-
ration. Moreover, a ‘‘fingerprint’’ of CRL ‘pieces’ is attached to a
subset of (verifiable) pseudonyms for fast CRL ‘piece’ validation
(while mitigating resource depletion attacks abusing the CRL dis-
tribution). Our experimental evaluation shows that our scheme is
efficient, scalable, dependable, and practical: with no more than
25 KB/s of traffic load, the latest CRL can be delivered to 95% of
the vehicles in a region (50×50 KM) within 15s, i.e., more than 40
times faster than the state-of-the-art. Overall, our scheme is a com-
prehensive solution that complements standards and can catalyze
the deployment of secure and privacy-protecting VC systems.
1 INTRODUCTION
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) comm-
unications seek to enhance transportation safety and efficiency.
It has been well-understood that Vehicular Communication (VC)
systems are vulnerable to attacks and that the privacy of their
users is at stake. As a result, security and privacy solutions have
been developed by standardization bodies (IEEE 1609.2 WG [10]
and ETSI [26]), harmonization efforts (C2C-CC [54]), and projects
(SeVeCom [66], PRESERVE [69], and CAMP [79]). A consensus to-
wards using Public Key Cryptography (PKC) to protect V2V/V2I
(V2X) communication is reached: a set of Certification Authorities
(CAs) constitutes the Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI),
providing multiple anonymous credentials, termed pseudonyms, to
legitimate vehicles. Vehicles switch from one pseudonym to a non-
previously used one towards unlinkability of digitally signed mes-
sages, and improved sender privacy for V2V/V2I messages. Pse-
udonymity is conditional in the sense that the corresponding long-
term vehicle identity (Long TermCertificate (LTC)) can be retrieved
by the VPKI entities if deviating from system policies.
In fact, vehicles can be compromised or faulty and disseminate
erroneous information across the V2Xnetwork [64, 70]. They should
be held accountable for such actions and credentials (their LTCs
and their pseudonyms) can be revoked. To efficiently revoke a set
of pseudonyms, one can disclose a single entry for all (revoked)
pseudonyms of the vehicle [29, 38, 49, 76]. However, upon a revo-
cation event, all non-revoked (but expired) pseudonyms belonging
to the ‘‘misbehaving’’ vehicle would also be linked. Linking pseu-
donyms with lifetimes prior to a revocation event implies that all
the corresponding digitally signed messages will be trivially linked.
Even if revocation is justified, this does not imply that a user ‘‘de-
serves’’ to abolish privacy prior to the revocation event. Avoid-
ing such a situation, i.e., achieving perfect-forward-privacy, can be
guaranteed if the VPKI entities are fully-trustworthy [39]. How-
ever, we need to guarantee strong user privacy even in the pres-
ence of honest-but-curious VPKI entity; recent revelations of mass
surveillance, e.g., [25, 37], show that assuming service providers
are fully-trustworthy is no longer a viable approach.
A main concern, relevant to all proposals in the literature [38,
39, 49, 61, 62, 67] is efficiency and scalability, essentially low com-
munication and computation overhead even as system dimension
grows. Consider first typical operational constraints: the average
daily commute time is less than an hour (on average 29.2 miles
and 46 minutes per day) [2, 4, 79] while the latencies for the dis-
semination of a full Certificate Revocation List (CRL) can exceed
the actual trip duration [1]. One can compress CRL using a Bloom
Filter (BF) [70, 71, 73]; however, the size of a CRL grows linearly
with the number of revoked pseudonyms, thus necessitates larger
BFs. More so, a sizable portion of the CRL information is irrele-
vant to a receiving vehicle and can be left unused. This, at the sys-
tem level, constitutes waste of computation, communication (band-
width), and storage resources. In turn, it leads to higher latency for
all vehicles to reconstruct the CRL, i.e., a degradation of timely dis-
tribution.
Alternatively, vehicles can only validate revocation status of
(their neighbors’) pseudonyms through an Online Certificate Sta-
tus Protocol (OCSP) [59]. Even if a VPKI system can comfortably
handle such a demanding load [44], OCSP cannot be used as a stan-
dalone solution in VC systems: it requires continuous connectivity
and significant bandwidth dedicated to revocation traffic, thus im-
practical due to the network volatility and scale [70]. Moreover,
what would be the course of action if the VPKI were not reachable
for other reasons, e.g., during a Denial of Service (DoS) attack? So,
the challenge is how can one distribute the most relevant revocation
information to a given vehicle, per trip, and ensure timely revocation
even without uninterrupted connectivity to the VPKI?
The computation overhead for the verification of the CRL could
interfere with safety- and time-critical operations especially if one
considers typical VC rates of 10 safety beacons per second, and
thus processing of possibly hundreds of messages from neighbor-
ing vehicles per second. Simply put, with existing computation
and communication overhead and given the time critical nature
of safety applications in VC systems, minimizing the overhead for
CRL verification and distribution is paramount.
From a different viewpoint, we need to allocate as little band-
width as possible for the CRL distribution in order not to interfere
with safety critical operations or enable an attacker to broadcast
a fake CRL at a high rate. However, this should be hand in hand
with timely CRL distribution. This can be achieved with the use of
Roadside Units (RSUs) [67]; however, dense deployment of RSUs
in a large-scale environment is costly. If the deployment is sparse,
a significant delay could be introduced. Alternatively, the CRL can
be distributed in a peer-to-peer, epidemic manner [38, 39, 49]. This
is a double-edged sword: abusive peers, seeking to compromise the
trustworthiness of the system, could pollute the CRL distribution
and mount a clogging DoS attack.
Despite the plethora of research efforts, none addresses all chal-
lenges at hand. In this paper, we show how to efficiently revoke a
very large volume of pseudonymswhile providing strong user privacy
protection, even in the presence of honest-but-curious VPKI entities.
Our system effectively, resiliently, and in a timely manner dissemi-
nate the authentic CRL throughout a large-scale (multi-domain) VC
system. Moreover, we ensure that the CRL distribution incurs low
overhead and prevents abuse of the distribution mechanism.
Contributions:Our comprehensive security and privacy-preserving
solution systematically addresses all key aspects of CRL-based re-
vocation, i.e., security, privacy, and efficiency. This is based on few
simple yet powerful, as it turns out, ideas. We propose making the
CRL acquisition process vehicle-centric: each vehicle only receives
the pieces of CRLs corresponding to its targeted region and its ac-
tual trip duration, i.e., obtaining only region- and time-relevant
revocation information. Moreover, randomly chosen pseudonyms
issued by the VPKI are selected to piggyback a notification about
new CRL-update events and an authenticator for efficiently vali-
dating pieces of the latest CRL; in other words, validation of the
CRL pieces almost for free. These novel features dramatically re-
duce the CRL size and CRL validation overhead, while they signif-
icantly increase its resiliency against resource depletion attacks.
In the rest of the paper, we critically survey the state-of-the-art
research efforts (Sec. 2) and describe the system model (Sec. 3). We
present system design (Sec. 4), followed by qualitative and quanti-
tative analysis (Sec. 5). We then conclude the paper (Sec. 6).
2 RELATED WORK
The need to evict misbehaving or compromised [64] vehicles from
a VC system is commonly accepted, because such vehicles can
threaten the safety of vehicles and users and degrade transporta-
tion efficiency. CRL distribution is of central importance and it is
the final and definitive line of defense [10, 26, 36, 66, 66, 71]: only
the VPKI can ‘‘ultimately’’ revoke a vehicle by including its unex-
pired certificates’ serial numbers in a CRL.
The literature proposes distribution of the CRL via RSUs [67]
and car-to-car epidemic communication [38, 39, 49], with enhance-
ments on the distribution of pieces [61, 62] evaluated in [12, 63]. A
naïve solution would be to digitally sign the entire CRL and broad-
cast it; however, it imposes difficulties in downloading a large CRL
file and exchanging it over short contact period (with an RSU or
a peer). Splitting the digitally signed CRL into multiple pieces is
vulnerable to pollution attacks: in the absence of fine-grained au-
thentication, per CRL piece, an adversary can delay or even pre-
vent reception by injecting fake pieces. Thus, the straightforward
solution is to have the VPKI prepare the CRL, split it into multiple
pieces, sign each piece, and distribute all of them across the VC
system. RSUs can broadcast CRL pieces randomly or in a round-
robin fashion [67], and vehicles can relay pieces until all vehicles
receive all pieces necessary to reconstruct the CRL [49]. Erasure
codes can be used to enhance the fault-tolerance of the CRL piece
distribution in the highly volatile VC environment [13, 67].
Signing each CRL piece so that it is self-verifiable, incurs signif-
icant computation overhead, which grows linearly with the num-
ber of CRL pieces, both for the VPKI and for the receiving vehi-
cles. Furthermore, an attacker could aggressively forge CRL pieces
for a DoS attack leveraging signature verification delays [40] that
can prevent vehicles from obtaining the genuine CRL pieces. A
‘‘precode-and-hash’’ scheme [60] proposes to calculate a hash value
of each pre-coded piece, sign it, and disseminate it with higher pri-
ority. Each relaying node can apply a different precode to the orig-
inal CRL and act as a secondary source. However, by applying dif-
ferent encodings to the original CRL file, another receiver cannot
reconstruct the entire CRL from the pieces, encoded differently by
various relaying nodes. To mitigate pollution and DoS attacks, we
propose to piggyback a fingerprint (a BF [17, 57]) for CRL pieces
into a subset of pseudonyms to validating CRL pieces ‘‘for free’’.
To efficiently revoke an ensemble of pseudonyms, one can en-
able revocation of multiple pseudonyms with a single CRL entry,
to reduce the CRL size, e.g., [29, 38, 49, 76]. Despite a huge reduc-
tion in size, such schemes do not provide perfect-forward-privacy:
upon a revocation event and CRL release, all the ‘‘non-revoked’’
but previously expired pseudonyms belonging to the evicted entity
would be linked as well. Although perfect-forward-privacy can be
achieved by leveraging a hash chain [39], the pseudonyms’ issuer
can trivially link all pseudonyms belonging to a vehicle, and thus
the pseudonymously authenticated messages, towards tracking it
for the entire duration of its presence in the system [29, 38, 39, 49,
76].
Compressing CRLs using a BF was proposed for compact stor-
age of revocation entries [71], or to efficiently distribute them across
the network [70, 71, 73]. However, the challenge is twofold: scal-
ability and efficiency. The size of a CRL linearly grows with the
number of revoked pseudonyms, but also a substantial portion of
the ‘‘compressed’’ CRL can be irrelevant to a receiving vehicle
and be left unused. Moreover, as it becomes clear in Sec. 5.1, com-
pressing CRLs using a BF does not necessarily reduce the size of a
CRL as vehicles can be provided with possibly hundreds of pseudo-
nyms [10]. Unlike such schemes [70, 71, 73], we do not compress
the CRL: our scheme disseminates only trip-relevant revocation
information to vehicles and it utilizes a BF to provide a condensed
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authenticator for the CRL pieces. Our scheme leverages and en-
hances the functionality of the state-of-the-art VPKI system [45]
towards efficiently revoking a batch of pseudonyms without com-
promising user privacy backwards: upon a revocation event, all
pseudonyms prior to the revocation event remain unlinkable (a
detailed description in Sec. 4.2).
Alternatively, vehicles could validate pseudonym status (revo-
cation) information through OCSP [59]. However, due to intermit-
tent VC network connectivity, significant usage of the bandwidth
by time- and safety-critical operations, and substantial overhead
for the VPKI (assuming the server is reachable), OCSP cannot re-
ally be used as a standalone solution [70]. A hybrid solution could
rely on distributing certificate status information to other mobile
nodes [30, 33--35, 53]; however, the system would be subject to the
reachability (of sufficientlymany cooperative) and the trustworthi-
ness of such nodes. In our scheme, we ensure that the latest CRL
is efficiently, effectively, and timely distributed among all vehicles
without any assumption on persistent reachability and trustwor-
thiness of specific mobile nodes.
Research efforts also focused on how to protect the VC systems
from misbehaving nodes, by temporarily ‘‘revoking’’ (isolating)
them from further access to the system [15, 58, 70, 71, 78] until con-
nection to the VPKI is established and they are fully evicted from
the system. Before the VPKI performs the ‘‘actual’’ eviction and
CRL distribution, these protocols build evidence, in fact local agree-
ment, that a given wrongdoer is present. This can serve towards
isolating misbehaving vehicles before the corresponding VPKI en-
tity takes the ‘‘ultimate’’ decision and commences the latest CRL
distribution.
C2C-CC [54] and V-token [74] propose to revoke only the LTC
of vehicles and let the pseudonyms expire. PUCA [31] requires the
owner of the pseudonym to trigger revocation, i.e., the system can-
not evict a misbehaving entity from the system. Clearly, leaving it
up to the misbehaving entity, or allowing it to act for a signifi-
cant period till pseudonyms expire, creates an unacceptable vul-
nerability window. Another line of studies proposes geo-casting
a ‘‘self-revocation’’ message, by the VPKI, across a region, to wipe
out the credentials from the Hardware Security Module (HSM) of a
misbehaving vehicle [32, 68, 70, 71]. However, an adversary could
control incoming messages, and prevent the ‘‘self-revocation’’ in-
struction from reaching the HSM, i.e., such schemes alone cannot
guarantee the trustworthiness of the system against misbehavior
unless the VPKI distributes the CRL enabling legitimate vehicles
to defend themselves against misbehavior or faulty peers.
Alternatively, the VPKI could provide vehicles for a long period,
e.g., 25 years, worth of pseudonyms with a decryption key for, e.g.,
a weekly batch of pseudonyms, delivered periodically [48]. This
would eliminate the need for bidirectional connectivity to the VPKI
to obtain pseudonyms. To evict a vehicle, the VPKI can stop deliver-
ing the corresponding decryption key to the vehicle HSM. Still, it is
imperative to distribute the CRL and cover the (weekly) period and
the corresponding revoked pseudonyms. Furthermore, having re-
leased a CRL towards the end of a week, signed messages with the
private keys corresponding to the recently revoked pseudonyms
(included in the CRL) can be linked, i.e., backwards-trackable for a
week (no perfect-forward-privacy for that period) [1].
Outside the VC realm, a recent comparative evaluation of clas-
sic Internet schemes is available [20]. Such schemes, e.g., [19, 22,
42, 50, 55, 56, 75], cannot be leveraged due to the nature of VC
systems, i.e., short-lived pseudonyms, highly dynamic intermittent
connectivity, and resource constraints. For example, CRLite [50]
stores CRLs in a filter-cascade BFwithout any false positive or false
negative; however, this necessitates little change in the set of re-
voked and non-revoked certificates. Obviously, this contradicts on-
demand pseudonym acquisition strategies for VC systems, e.g., [16,
29, 31, 43--46, 52, 74], which are more efficient (than preloading for
a long duration, e.g., [48]) in terms of pseudonym utilization and
revocation, thus more effective in fending off misbehavior.
3 MODEL AND REQUIREMENTS
3.1 System Model and Assumptions
A VPKI consists of a set of Certification Authorities (CAs) with
distinct roles: the Root CA (RCA), the highest-level authority, cer-
tifies other lower-level authorities; the Long Term CA (LTCA) is
responsible for the vehicle registration and the Long Term Certifi-
cate (LTC) issuance, and the Pseudonym CA (PCA) issues pseudo-
nyms for the registered vehicles. Pseudonyms have a lifetime (a va-
lidity period), typically ranging fromminutes to hours; in principle,
the shorter the pseudonym lifetime is, the higher the unlinkability
and thus the higher privacy protection can be achieved.We assume
that each vehicle is registered only with its Home-LTCA (H-LTCA),
the policy decision and enforcement point, reachable by the regis-
tered vehicles. Without loss of generality, a domain can be defined
as a set of vehicles in a region, registered with the H-LTCA, sub-
ject to the same administrative regulations and policies [47]. There
can be several PCAs, each active in one or more domains. Each
vehicle can cross in to foreign domains and communicate with the
Foreign-LTCA (F-LTCA) towards obtaining pseudonyms, i.e., a new
set of pseudonyms when entering a new domain, to operate as a
native vehicle in that region. Trust between two domains can be
established with the help of the RCA, or through cross certifica-
tion. Moreover, the certificates of higher-level authorities are in-
stalled in the On-Board Units (OBUs), which are loosely synchro-
nized with the VPKI servers. The RSUs could be deployed by other
authorities than the VPKI ones, thus they only expose minimal
information, e.g., IP address and location, to the corresponding
PCAs.
All vehicles (OBUs) registered in the system are provided with
HSMs, ensuring that private keys never leave the HSM. Moreover,
we assume that there is a misbehavior detection system, e.g., [15],
that triggers the revocation1. The Resolution Authority (RA) can
initiate a process to resolve and revoke all pseudonyms of a mis-
behaving vehicle: it interacts with the corresponding PCAs and
LTCA (a detailed protocol description, e.g., in [44, 45]) to resolve
and revoke all credentials issued for a misbehaving vehicle. Conse-
quently, the misbehaving vehicle can no longer obtain credentials
from the VPKI. The VPKI is responsible for distributing the CRLs
1The faulty behavior detection depends on, e.g., data-centric plausibility and consis-
tency checks, and it is orthogonal to this investigation.
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and notifying all legitimate entities about the revocation; this im-
plies a new CRL-update event.2
3.2 Adversarial Model
We extend the general adversary model in secure vehicular comm-
unications [65] to include VPKI entities that are honest-but-curious,
i.e., entities complyingwith security protocols and policies, butmo-
tivated to profile users. In a multi-domain VC environment, inter-
nal adversaries, i.e., malicious, compromised, or non-cooperative
clients, and external adversaries, i.e., unauthorized entities, raise
four challenges. More specifically in the context of this work, ad-
versaries can try to (i) exclude revoked pseudonym serial num-
bers from a CRL, (ii) add valid pseudonyms by forging a fake CRL
(piece), or (iii) prevent legitimate entities from obtaining genuine
and the most up-to-date CRL (pieces), or delay the CRL distribu-
tion by replaying old, spreading fake CRL (pieces), or performing
a DoS attack. This allows wrong-doers to remain operational in
the VC system using their current revoked pseudonym sets. More-
over, they might be simply non-cooperative or malicious, tempted
to prevent other vehicles from receiving a notification on a new
CRL-update event, thus preventing them from requesting to down-
load the CRLs. Lastly, (iv) VPKI entities (in collusion with vehicle
communication observers) could potentially link messages signed
under (non-revoked but expired) pseudonyms prior to the revoca-
tion events, e.g., inferring sensitive information from the CRLs to-
wards linking pseudonyms, and thus tracking vehicles backwards.
The PCAs operating in a domain (or across domains) could also
collude, i.e., share information that each of them individually has,
to harm user privacy.3
3.3 Requirements
Security and privacy requirements for V2X communications have
been specified in the literature, e.g., as early as [65], and additional
requirements specifically for VPKI entities in [45]. Next, we com-
pile security and privacy, as well as functional and performance,
requirements for the CRL distribution problem.
R1. Fine-grained authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation:
Each CRL (piece) should be authenticated and its integrity be pro-
tected, i.e., preventing alternation or replays. Moreover, each CRL
(piece) should be non-repudiably connected to its originator (the
VPKI entity).
R2. Unlinkability (perfect-forward-privacy): CRLs should not en-
able any observer (even in collusion with a single VPKI entity) to
link pseudonyms (and thus the corresponding signed messages)
prior to their revocation. In fact, upon a revocation event, all non-
revoked previously expired pseudonyms of an evicted vehicle should
remain unlinkable.
R3. Availability: The system should ensure any legitimate ve-
hicle can obtain the latest CRL within a reasonable time interval
2The revocation information of other system entities, e.g., VPKI entities, need to be
distributed as well. Here, we only focus on the distribution of revoked pseudonyms.
3Note that ‘‘malicious’’ VPKI entities could attempt to influence the distribution of
CRLs, e.g., manipulating the CRL entries unlawfully; this is out of the scope of our
honest-but-curious adversarial model.
despite of benign failures, e.g., system faults or crashes, or net-
work outages, e.g., intermittent connectivity. Moreover, the sys-
tem should be resilient to active disruptions, including resource
depletion attacks.
R4. Efficiency:Generating, validating, and disseminating theCRL
(pieces) and revocation event notification should be efficient and
scalable even if the number of vehicles and credentials grow, i.e.,
incurring low computation and communication overhead. More-
over, a small fraction of bandwidth should be used for CRL distri-
bution, in order not to interfere with transportation safety- and
time-critical operations. However, allocation of a small amount of
bandwidth in a timely fashion should be sufficient to distribute
CRLs to all legitimate vehicles.
R5. Explicit and/or implicit notification on revocation events: The
system should notify, explicitly or implicitly, every legitimate ve-
hicle within the system (domain) regarding revocation events and
then CRL-updates (availability of new revocation information).
4 DESIGN
4.1 Motivation and Overview
Preliminaryassumptions:We leverage the state-of-the-art VPKI
system [45] that provides pseudonyms in an on-demand fashion:
each vehicle ‘‘decides’’ when to trigger the pseudonym acquisi-
tion process based on various factors [43]. Such a scheme requires
sparse connectivity to the VPKI, but it facilitates an OBU to be
preloaded with pseudonyms proactively, covering a longer period,
e.g., a week or a month, should the connectivity be expected heav-
ily intermittent. The efficiency, scalability and robustness of the
VPKI system is systematically investigated [43, 45] with the VPKI
handles a large workload. Moreover, it enhances user privacy, no-
tably preventing linking pseudonyms based on timing information
(the instance of issuance and the pseudonym lifetime) as well as of-
fers strong user privacy protection even in the presence of honest-
but-curious VPKI entities. More precisely, a universally fixed in-
terval, Γ, is specified by the H-LTCA and all pseudonyms in that
domain are issued with the lifetime (τP ) aligned with the VPKI
clock. Vehicles obtain pseudonyms on-the-fly as they operate, and
the number of pseudonyms in a request is Γτp , i.e., no prior cal-
culation needed. As a result of this policy, at any point in time,
all the vehicles transmit using pseudonyms that are indistinguish-
able thanks to this time alignment, i.e., eliminating any distinction
among pseudonym sets of different vehicles, thus enhancing user
privacy. We leverage and enhance the functionality of this VPKI
system; in particular, our solution necessitates two modifications
during pseudonym acquisition process, notably (i) implicitly bind-
ing pseudonyms issued to a given requester per Γ, and (ii) integrat-
ing a fingerprint into a subset of the pseudonyms for efficient CRL
validation.
High-level overview: The default policy is to distribute all re-
vocation information to all vehicles. Nonetheless, this approach ig-
nores the locality, the temporal nature of pseudonyms, and other
constraints, e.g., the average daily commute time. Locality could
be geographical, i.e., credentials relative to the corresponding re-
gion, and temporal, i.e., relevance to the lifetime of pseudonyms
with respect to the trip duration of a vehicle. To efficiently, effec-
tively, and timely distribute the CRLs across the V2X network, we
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propose making the CRL acquisition process vehicle-centric, i.e.,
through a content-based and context-sensitive ‘‘publish-subscribe’’
scheme [27, 41].
Fig. 1 shows that by starting a new trip, each vehicle only sub-
scribes to receive the pieces of CRLs, i.e., the content, correspond-
ing to its actual trip duration and its targeted region, i.e., the con-
text. To reap the benefits of the ephemeral nature pseudonyms
and the timely-aligned pseudonym provisioning policy, towards
an effective, efficient, and scalable CRL distribution, a fixed inter-
val, ΓCRL , is predetermined by the PCAs in the domain. They pub-
licize revoked pseudonyms whose lifetimes fall within ΓCRL , i.e.,
distributing only the serial number of these pseudonyms rather
than publishing the entire CRL. Note that Γ, the universally fixed
interval to obtain pseudonyms [45], and ΓCRL are not necessarily
aligned due to the unpredictable nature of revocation events.
When a vehicle reliably connects to the VPKI, it can obtain the
‘‘necessary’’ CRL pieces corresponding to its trip duration during
the pseudonym acquisition phase. However, if reliable connectiv-
ity is not guaranteed, or if a vehicle obtained (possibly preloaded
with enough) pseudonyms in advance, or a new revocation event
happens, one can be notified about a new CRL-update (revocation)
event: a signed fingerprint (a Bloom Filter (BF) [17, 57]) of CRL
pieces is broadcasted by RSUs and it is integrated in a subset of
recently issued pseudonyms, this way readily broadcasted by ve-
hicles (termed fingerprint-carrier nodes) along with their Cooper-
ative Awareness Messages (CAMs). This essentially piggybacks a
notification about the latest CRL-update event and an authentica-
tor for validating CRL pieces. This provides CRL validation for free:
pseudonyms are readily validated by the receiving vehicles since
each vehicle verifies the signature on a pseudonym before validat-
ing the content of a CAM, i.e., the verification of CRL pieces does
not incur extra computation overhead. This eliminates the need
for signature verification, but a BF membership test, for each CRL
piece as the fingerprint is signed with the private key of the PCA.
Our scheme does not require prior knowledge on trip duration
in order to obtain CRLs, i.e., a vehicle can be oblivious to the trip
duration. In fact, such information would not be relevant to the
CRL dissemination: due to the unpredictable nature of revocation
events, the PCAs disseminate at each point revoked pseudonyms
whose lifetimes fall within a ΓCRL interval. As long as a vehicle
moves inside a domain, it does not need to receive CRLs from
other domains: all vehicles in the domain are issued pseudonyms
by the PCAs in that domain. In other words, our scheme does not
require any communication and cooperation between RSUs and
PCAs from different domains on CRL construction and distribu-
tion tasks; only PCAs-RSUs collaboration within a domain. The
PCAs operating in a domain construct the CRLs and push the CRL
pieces to the RSUs so that the RSUs broadcast the CRL pieces for
the current ΓCRL .
Γ2
  CRL
Γ1
  CRL
Γ3
  CRL
System Time
Trip Duration
Figure 2: A vehicle-centric approach: each vehicle only sub-
scribes for pieces of CRLs corresponding to its trip duration.
Fig. 2 illustrates an example of 24 revoked pseudonyms to be
distributed. A vehicle traveling within Γ1
CRL
would possibly only
face revoked pseudonyms with a lifetime falling in that interval, 6
pseudonyms, shown in black, instead of all 24 entries (the blurred
pseudonyms are expired, thus not included in the CRL). These 6 re-
voked pseudonyms within Γ1
CRL
can be implicitly bound without
compromising their unlinkability prior to the revocation event, in
a way that one can simply derive subsequent pseudonyms from
an anchor (the blurred pseudonyms are non-revoked but expired
and they cannot be linked to the revoked ones; this becomes clear
later). Thus, in this example, distributing 3 entries for that vehicle
is sufficient. Another vehicle, however, traveling for a longer dura-
tion, e.g., from themiddle of Γ1
CRL
till the beginning of Γ3
CRL
, would
need to be provided with all 24 revocation entries, i.e., requiring 9
entries to derive all 24 revoked pseudonyms.
In a more realistic example, assume there are 1 million vehicles
in the system, each has 6 hours worth of pseudonyms (72 pseudo-
nyms per day with Γ = 30 min and τP = 5 min, i.e., 6 pseudo-
nyms per Γ), all are issued timely aligned with the rest with non-
overlapping intervals [45]. Suppose 1 percent of them are compro-
mised or their sensors became faulty and thus evicted from the
system. As a result, the revocation information to be disseminated
for a day contains 720,000 entires, thus a CRL of around 22 MB
(with 256-bit long serial numbers per pseudonym). By implicitly
binding pseudonyms belonging to each OBU, one can distribute 1
entry for a batch of revoked pseudonyms per Γ (with some addi-
tional information), in total, 12 entries per revoked vehicle instead
of 72 entries. Thus, the size of the CRL for that day becomes 7.3
MB, with 120,000 entries (with 256-bit serial numbers and 256-bit
of complementary information for each entry). This already shows
a significant reduction of the CRL size. However, distributing all
that revocation information ignores the temporal nature of pseu-
donyms and the vehicle trip duration; it is more effective to distrib-
ute revocation information for a protocol-selectable period in the
near future. Therefore, when a vehicle is to travel approximately
within a ΓCRL interval, assumed for example to be 30 min, it will
only receive pieces of information for that ΓCRL , i.e., around 10,000
entries and thus a CRL size of 625 KB instead of 22MB, i.e., 3 orders
of magnitude reduction of the CRL size distributed at any point in
time.
5
Table 1: Notation Used in the Protocols.
Notation Description Notation Description
(P iv )pca , P
i
v a valid psnym signed by the PCA Append() appending a revoked psnym SN to CRLs
(K iv ,k
i
v ) psnym pub./priv. key pairs BFTest() BF membership test
(Kpca ;Lkpca) long-term pub./priv. key pairs p, K false positive rate, optimal hash functions
(msд)σv signed msg with vehicle’s priv. key Γ interval to issue time-aligned psnyms
LTC Long Term Certificate ΓCRL interval to release CRLs
tnow , ts , te a fresh, starting, ending timestamp RIK revocation identifiable key
Ttimeout response reception timeout B max. bandwidth for CRL distribution
n-tkt , (n-tkt)l tca a native ticket R revocation rate
Idreq, Idres request/response identifiers N total number of CRL pieces in each ΓCRL
SN psnym serial number n number of remaining psnyms in each batch
Siдn(Lkca,msд) signing a msg with CA’s priv. key k index of the first revoked psnym
Veri f y(LTCca,msд) verifying with the CA’s pub. key CRLv CRL version
GenRnd(),rand(0,∗) GEN. a random number, or in range ∅ Null or empty vector
Hk (),H hash function (k times), hash value k, j, m, ζ temporary variables
4.2 Security Protocols
In a nutshell, the PCAs operating in a domain construct the CRLs
by sorting the revoked pseudonyms based on their validity periods
in a ΓCRL interval and push them to the RSUs (Sec. 4.2.2). For ease
of exposition, we assume there is one PCA, even though the ex-
tension of our scheme with multiple PCAs within a given domain
is straightforward. RSUs and fingerprint-carrier peers publish the
CRL-update notification and the CRL pieces (Sec. 4.2.3). Upon re-
ceiving a new revocation event, each vehicle broadcasts a query to
its neighbors to fetch the (missing) pieces of the CRL, e.g., similarly
to [23], corresponding to its actual trip duration (Sec. 4.2.4). Finally,
it parses recovered CRL pieces and stores them locally (Sec. 4.2.5).
Beyond CRL distribution protocols, we provide a modified pseu-
donym acquisition process (Sec. 4.2.1): all pseudonyms belonging
to a requester in a Γ are issued in a way that does not link them, un-
less the PCA reveals only the first revoked pseudonym serial num-
ber in a Γ interval. Moreover, a fraction of pseudonyms is equipped
with a fingerprint of CRL pieces in a Γ interval, to facilitate fast val-
idation of CRL pieces. The notation is given in Table 1.
4.2.1 Pseudonym Acquisition Process (Protocol 1). A ve-
hicle first requests an anonymous ticket [43, 44] from its H-LTCA,
using it to interact with the desired PCA to obtain pseudonyms.
Upon reception of a valid ticket, it generates Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) public/private key pairs [10, 26] and
sends the request to the PCA [43, 44]. Vehicle-LTCA is over mutu-
ally authenticated Transport Layer Security (TLS) [24] tunnels (or
Datagram TLS (DTLS) [72]) and the vehicle-PCA communication
is over a unidirectional (server-only) authenticated TLS (or DTLS).
Having received a request, the PCA verifies the ticket signed
by the H-LTCA (assuming trust is established between the two)
(steps 1.2–1.3). Then, the PCA generates a randomnumber (step 1.4)
and initiates a proof-of-possession protocol to verify the owner-
ship of the corresponding private keys by the vehicle (step 1.7).
Then, it calculates H (IKtkt | |K
i
v | |t
i
s | |t
i
e | |H
i (Rndv ))
4, the ‘‘revoca-
tion identifiable key’’ (RIK ). This essentially prevents a compro-
mised PCA from mapping a different ticket during resolution pro-
cess (step 1.8). The PCA implicitly correlates a batch of pseudo-
nyms belonging to each requester (steps 1.9–1.13). This essentially
enables efficient distribution of the CRL: the PCA only needs to
include one entry per batch of pseudonyms without compromis-
ing their unlinkability. Finally, the PCA issues the pseudonyms
(steps 1.14–1.15) and delivers the response (step 1.17). Note that
4 IKtkt in a ticket prevents even a compromised H-LTCA from mapping the ticket to
a different LTC during resolution process [45].
Protocol 1 Issuing Pseudonyms (by the PCA)
1: procedure IssuePsnyms(Req)
2: Req → (Idr eq, ts , te , (tkt )σltca , {(K
1
v )σ
k1v
, · · · , (Knv )σknv
}, nonce, tnow )
3: Verify(LTCl tca, (tkt )σltca )
4: Rndv ← GenRnd ()
5: for i:=1 to n do
6: Begin
7: Verify(K iv , (K
i
v )σ
kiv
)
8: RIK
Piv
← H (IKtkt | |K
i
v | |t
i
s | |t
i
e | |H
i (Rndv ))
9: if i = 1 then
10: SN i ← H (RIK
Piv
| |H i (Rndv ))
11: else
12: SN i ← H (SN i−1 | |H i (Rndv ))
13: end if
14: ζ ← (SN i , K iv , CRLv, BFΓi
CRL
, RIK
Piv
, t is , t
i
e )
15: (P iv )σpca ← Siдn(Lkpca, ζ )
16: End
17: return (Idr es, {(P
1
v )σpca , . . . , (P
n
v )σpca }, Rndv , nonce+1, tnow )
18: end procedure
Protocol 2 CRL Construction (by the PCA)
1: procedure GenCRL(Γi
CRL
, B)
2: Piece
Γ
i
CRL
← ∅
3: repeat
4: {SN kP , H
k
Rndv
, n } ← f etchRevokedPsnyms(ΓiCRL )
5: if SN k
P
, Null then
6: Piece
Γ
i
CRL
← Append ({SN k
P
, H k
Rndv
, n })
7: end if
8: until SN k
P
== Null
9: N ←
⌈ size (Piece
Γ
i
CRL
)
B
⌉
⊲ calculating number of pieces with a given B
10: for j ← 0, N do ⊲ N: number of pieces in Γi
CRL
11: Piece
j
Γ
i
CRL
← Split (Piece
Γ
i
CRL
, B, N ) ⊲ splitting into N pieces
12: end for
13: return {(Piece1
Γ
i
CRL
), . . . , (PieceN
Γ
i
CRL
)}
14: end procedure
a PCA randomly selects some of the pseudonyms to be fingerprint-
carriers by integrating a BF of all CRL pieceswithin a ΓCRL (BFΓi
CRL
)
(step 1.14). This parameter (fraction of fingerprint-carriers) can be
set based on different factors, e.g., frequency of revocation events
and coverage of deployed RSUs, which are beyond the scope of this
work.
4.2.2 PCA Operation for CRL Construction (Protocol 2).
When a vehicle is to be evicted, the PCA sorts revoked pseudonyms
based on the pseudonyms validity intervals in each ΓCRL . It then
appends the following data for each batch of pseudonyms: (i) the
serial number of the first revoked pseudonym in the chain (SN i ),
(ii) a hash value (H i
Rndv
), and (iii) the number of remaining pseu-
donyms in this batch (n) (steps 2.2– 2.8). It then splits the CRL into
multiple pieces according to the maximum allocated bandwidth,
i.e., system parameter B, for CRL distribution (steps 2.9– 2.13). The
number of revocation entries is proportional to the number of pseu-
donyms and vehicles, and revocation events, e.g., due to vehicle-
compromising malware propagation, evaluated in Sec. 5.
4.2.3 Operations for Publishing theCRL (Protocol 3). Each
RSU continuously broadcasts the signed fingerprint of CRL pieces,
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Protocol 3 Publishing CRLs (by the OBUs)
1: procedure PublishCRL()
2: {(Idr eq, Γ
i
CRL
, [indexes])} = receiveQuery((ζ )σ
Piv
)
3: Ver if y(P iv, (ζ )σ
Piv
)
4: CRL∗
Γ
i
CRL
= searchlocal (Γ
i
CRL
) ⊲ search local repository
5: j ← r and (0, ∗) ⊲ randomly select one of the available pieces
6: if CRL
j
Γ
i
CRL
, ∅ then
7: broadcast ({Idr es, CRL
j
Γ
i
CRL
})
8: end if
9: end procedure
Protocol 4 Subscribing to CRL Pieces (by the OBUs)
1: procedure SubscribeCRL(Γi
CRL
, N )
2: respf inal ← ∅, j ← 0, t ← tnow +Tt imeout
3: repeat
4: ζ ← (Idr eq, Γ
i
CRL
, [missinд pieces indexes])
5: (ζ )σv ← Siдn(k
i
v , ζ )
6: broadcast ((ζ )σ
Piv
, P iv )
7: Piece
j
Γ
i
CRL
← receiveBef ore (t )
8: if BFTest (Piece
j
Γ
i
CRL
, BF
Γ
i
CRL
) then
9: respf inal ← Store (Piece
j
Γ
i
CRL
) ⊲ storing in local repository
10: end if
11: j ← j + 1
12: until j > N
13: return respf inal
14: end procedure
to notify vehicles in a region about any new revocation event. The
transmission rate of the signed fingerprint corresponding to the
current Γi
CRL
can gradually decrease towards the end of Γi
CRL
; in-
stead, the transmission rate of the signed fingerprint for Γi+1
CRL
can
moderately increase. This ‘‘ensures’’ that all legitimate vehicles
are notified about a new revocation event, thus being capable to
request and efficiently validate CRL pieces (evaluated in Fig. 6.b).
Upon reception and validation of a query, an RSU commences trans-
mission across the wireless data link with a low-rate transmission
(without any acknowledgment from peers).
Upon receiving an authentic query for the missing CRL pieces
(steps 3.2–3.3) by a neighboring vehicle, a vehicle searches its lo-
cal repository and randomly chooses one of the requested pieces
and broadcasts it (steps 3.4–3.8). The maximum allocated band-
width for CRL distribution is B, chosen to be much smaller than
C , the bandwidth the data link support (B ≪ C). Such a rate limit-
ing mechanism ensures that a compromised insider cannot abuse
the allocated bandwidth towards performing a DoS attack, thus
CRL distribution does not interfere with other safety-critical oper-
ations.
4.2.4 Operations for CRL Subscription (Protocol 4). Each
vehicle can receive necessary CRL pieces corresponding to its ac-
tual trip duration from nearby RSUs or neighboring vehicles. A
vehicle broadcasts a signed query to its neighbors, to receive the
missing pieces of the revocation information of Γi
CRL
duringwhich
the vehicle wishes to travel (steps 4.2– 4.6). Having received a CRL
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Figure 3: Extra overhead for CRL fingerprints.
piece, it simply validates the piece by testing against the signed fin-
gerprint (already obtained from RSUs in vicinity or integrated in a
subset of recently issued pseudonyms broadcasted in the network).
If the BF test is successful, it accepts that piece and keeps request-
ing until successfully receiving all remaining pieces (steps 4.7– 4.12).
4.2.5 Operations for Parsing CRL. Upon reception and val-
idation of a CRL piece, each vehicle derives the revoked pseudo-
nym serial numbers from the obtained hash anchors, by calculating
a hash value n times: H (SN i | |H (H i
Rndv
)). Revocation entries can
be stored in local storage, e.g., [33], and searched with O(loд(n))
time complexity. To enhance revocation status validation, a vehi-
cle could generate a BF locally [39] with constant computational
cost (O(1)) for insertions and search operations but at a cost of a
false positive rate. Note that the revocation entries are stored for
the period they are valid for, i.e., within a Γi
CRL
interval.
5 SCHEME ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
We first discuss how our scheme satisfies the security and pri-
vacy requirements, as well as operational requirements defined in
Sec. 3.3 and then demonstrate quantitatively its efficiency, scalabil-
ity, and resiliency through an extensive experimental evaluation.
5.1 Qualitative Analysis
Fine-grained authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation: The au-
thenticity and integrity of each CRL piece is validated by testing
each piece against the fingerprint, periodically broadcasted by RSUs
and integrated in a subset of recently issued pseudonyms (R1). More-
over, no PCA can deny the inclusion of pseudonym serial number
as the fingerprint of CRL pieces is signed with the PCA’s private
key (R1). Furthermore, each query to obtain CRL pieces is authen-
ticated, in fact signed with the current valid pseudonym of the
vehicle, thus preventing from abusing mechanism. If a legitimate-
looking node aggressively requests CRL pieces, responding to such
requests can be of the lowest priority and they are reported as po-
tential misbehavior.
Representing CRL pieces in a space-efficient BF trades off com-
munication overhead for a false positive rate (p). Fig. 3.a shows that
the BF size linearly increases as the false positive rate decreases.
For example, for 10 CRL pieces covering one ΓCRL , and p = 10
−20
(with the optimal number of hash functions), the BF size and thus
the overhead for each pseudonym is 120 bytes. This eliminates the
need to sign each CRL piece. However, one might target the false
positive rate of a BF towards generating a fake piece of CRL to be
accepted as legitimate. This is different from a pollution or a Dis-
tributed DoS (DDoS) attack: not only would it prevent a legitimate
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vehicle from obtaining a genuine CRL piece, but also disseminate
an authentic-looking piece that passes the BF test; in fact, such at-
tacks can rely on sheer computational power.
Our scheme resists such attacks that attempt to exclude revoked
pseudonym serial numbers or add valid ones by forging a fake
CRL piece that passes the BF test.5 An adversary could buy top-
notch bitcoin-mining hardware, Antminer-S9 [6] (14TH/s, $3,000).
If ΓCRL = 1 hour and p = 10
−20, and the optimal number of
hash functions, K = 67, the adversary needs 132,936 Antminer-S9
($400M) to generate a bogus piece within ΓCRL (
1020×67
14×1012
). Alterna-
tively, he could join AntPool [5], one of the largest Bitcoin min-
ing pools, (1, 604, 608 TH/s) to generate a fake piece in 70 min,
which might seem to be practical. However, if p = 10−22 (with
K = 73) or even p = 10−23 (with K = 76), the adversary would
need 5 or 55 days, respectively ( 10
22×73
1.6×1018
= 126h, 10
23×76
1.6×1018
= 1, 319h).
With inherently short τP (important for unlinkability and thus pri-
vacy) and ΓCRL , proper choice of p makes attacks infeasible; in
other words, irrelevant, as forged pieces refer to already expired
credentials. Upon receiving conflicting pieces, vehicles report mis-
behavior to the VPKI to take appropriate actions, e.g., adjusting p.
The results of our experiments in Sec. 5.2 rely on p = 10−30 and
K = 100.
The PCA can concatenate the hash values for each CRL piece [60],
or alternatively truncate the output of hash functions. Fig. 3.b shows
the size of a CRL fingerprint with different hash functions. For in-
stance, by employing precode-and-hash with SHA1 (20 bytes out-
put size) [60], the size of a fingerprint for 20 CRL pieces becomes
400 bytes; whereas employing our scheme results in an extra over-
head of 311 bytes (p = 10−25) or 371 bytes for the extremely low
false positive rate (p = 10−30).
Unlinkability (perfect-forward-privacy):Upon a revocation event
and CRL release, an external observer can try to link the revoked
pseudonyms backwards (towards the beginning of the Γ interval).
However, it is infeasible to link the previously non-revoked (but
expired) pseudonyms belonging to a misbehaving vehicle due to
the utilization of a hash-chain during pseudonym issuance pro-
cess (SN i ← H (RIKP iv
| |H i
Rndv
) or SN i ← H (SN i−1 | |H (H i
Rndv
)),
i.e., strong user privacy protection for a period, during which the
vehicle was not compromised (R2).
In collusionwith V2X observers, honest-but-curious PCAs oper-
ating in a given domainmight be tempted to infer sensitive informat-
ion from the pseudonyms, e.g., timing information, or, in our con-
text, the CRLs, towards linking pseudonym sets and tracking a ve-
hicle. However, all the issued pseudonyms are aligned with global
system time (PCA clock), thus, there is no distinction among pseu-
donyms based on pseudonym timing information. Moreover, the
CRLs do not disclose extra information to harm user privacy6. More-
over, PCAs randomly select a subset of pseudonyms to be fingerprint-
carries; thus, correlating any of these pseudonyms does not imply
that they belong to the same vehicle (R2).
5Generating a fake BF with completely different valid pseudonyms serial number
necessitates accessing at least, e.g., 1020 , valid pseudonyms, i.e., a more powerful ad-
versary (malicious VPKI entities), and is beyond the scope of our adversarial model.
6Each PCA can trivially link the issued pseudonyms for the same vehicle as a response
to a single request. However, one can configure the system to achieve full unlinka-
bility, i.e., Γ is set equal to τP and force obtaining each single pseudonym with a
different ticket. This implies that even honest-but-curious PCAs cannot link any two
pseudonyms issued for a single vehicle, but it would be impractical in most setting.
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Figure 4: (a) CRL size comparison for C2RL and vehicle-
centric scheme (10,000 revoked vehicles). (b) Achieving
vehicle-centric comparable CRL size for the C2RL scheme.
Availability: We leverage RSUs and car-to-car epidemic distri-
bution to disseminate CRL pieces and signed fingerprints for in-
creased availability or intermittent connectivity (R3). The resilience
to pollution and DDoS attacks stems from three factors: (i) a huge
reduction of the CRL size, notably because of distributing CRL
information only for relevant periods of time, (ii) very efficient ver-
ification of CRL pieces, i.e., testing against a BF with hash and not
signature validation, and (iii) integrating the fingerprint of CRL
pieces in a subset of pseudonyms (R3).
Efficiency: The efficiency stems from the efficient construction
of an authenticator for CRL pieces (minimal overhead on the PCA
side), fast verification of each piece (minimal overhead on the vehi-
cle side), and implicit binding of a batch of pseudonyms. Moreover,
leveraging recurrent interactions with the VPKI, which issues time-
aligned pseudonyms for all vehicles, and distributing CRLs with
respect to locality, the ephemeral nature of credentials, and the av-
erage trip duration enhances efficiency (R4). We allocate a small
fraction of bandwidth for CRL distribution and we apply a rate
limiting mechanism to prevent abuse of the mechanism (R3-R4).
However, allocating a small amount of bandwidth is sufficient to
timely distribute CRLs to practically all legitimate vehicles within
the system (R4), as demonstrated in Sec. 5.2.1. Note that if pseudo-
nyms were provided for a long period and vehicles had only uni-
directional connectivity [48], then the VPKI cannot integrate new
information into the pseudonyms for efficiency reasons. Thus, the
signed fingerprint of CRL pieces would need to be disseminated
through RSUs on a weekly basis.
Explicit and/or implicit notification on revocation events: Mali-
cious entities might try to prevent other legitimate vehicles from
receiving CRL-update notifications, thus preventing them from re-
questing the latest CRL, i.e., compromising availability and essen-
tially harming the VC system security (as evicted nodes would re-
main undetected). RSUs periodically broadcast the signed finger-
print, corresponding to all CRL pieces of a given ΓCRL , to ensure re-
ception of the CRL validation authenticator in a region. Moreover,
the PCAs randomly choose a subset of recently issued pseudonyms
to piggyback the CRL-update notification. Vehicles beacon CAMs
at a high rate, each signed with the private key of a pseudonym
that possibly carries a notification about a CRL-update event and
attach the pseudonym to a significant fraction of CAMs, in fact
free notification about a revocation event at any point in time in
the system (R5). Further evidence to the availability, the resiliency,
and the efficiency, is provided through the detailed experimental
evaluation in Sec. 5.2.
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Table 2: Simulation Parameters (LuST dataset).
Parameters Value Parameters Value
CRL/Fingerprint TX interval 0.5s/5s Pseudonym lifetime 30s-600s
Carrier frequency 5.89 GHz Area size 50 KM × 50 KM
TX power 20mW Number of vehicles 138,259
Physical layer bit-rate 18Mbps Number of trips 287,939
Sensitivity -89dBm Average trip duration 692.81s
Thermal noise -110dBm Duration of simulation 4 hour (7-9, 17-19)
CRL dist. Bandwidth (B) 10, 25, 50 KB/s Γ 1-60 min
Number of RSUs 100 ΓCRL 60 min
Table 3: LuST Revocation Information (R = 1%, B = 10KB/s ).
Pseudonym
Lifetime
Number of
Psnyms
Number of
Revoked Psnyms
Average
Number per ΓCRL
Number of
Pieces
τP=30s 3,425,565 34,256 1,428 12
τP=60s 1,712,782 17,128 710 6
τP=300s 342,556 3,426 143 2
τP=600s 171,278 1,713 72 1
Table 4: Simulation Parameters for LuST Dataset (τP = 60s).
Revocation
Rate (R)
Baseline Scheme Vehicle-Centric Scheme
CRL
Entries
10 KB/s 25 KB/s 50 KB/s CRL
Entries
10 KB/s 25 KB/s 50 KB/s
Pieces Pieces Pieces Pieces Pieces Pieces
0.5% 8,500 70 30 15 355 3 2 1
1% 17,000 140 59 30 710 6 3 2
2% 34,000 279 117 59 1,417 12 5 3
3% 51,000 419 175 89 2,125 18 8 4
4% 68,000 558 233 118 2,834 24 10 5
5% 85,000 697 291 148 3,542 30 13 7
CRL size comparison: The size of a CRL by compressing the
revocation information into a BF, i.e., C2RL scheme [70, 71, 73], is
mBF = −
N ×M × ln p
(ln2)2
[77], where N is the total number of compro-
mised vehicles, M is the average number of revoked pseudonyms
per vehicle per ΓCRL , and p is the probability of false positive
7.
Fig. 4.a illustrates that the size of a CRL with C2RL grows linearly
withM . Using our vehicle-centric scheme, it is sufficient to disclose
one entry to revoke all pseudonyms of an evicted vehicle within
a ΓCRL interval, i.e., the size of a CRL in each ΓCRL is a constant
value with respect toM : (256+256)×N , with 256 bits for a pseudo-
nym serial number and 256 bits for its corresponding hash value
(excluding an extra byte, the number of remaining pseudonyms in
each batch). Fig. 4.b shows that compressing revocation informat-
ion with a BF could have comparable overhead, i.e., CRL size, with
our scheme only if the probability of false positive increases. For ex-
ample, ifM = 10, the false positive rate for C2RL scheme should be
10−10 to achieve a CRL size comparable to our scheme; otherwise,
compressing a CRL with a BF is not as efficient as our scheme. Ex-
actly because each PCA issues multiple pseudonyms in each Γ (for
various reasons, e.g., VPKI performance and connectivity) [45], we
achieve a significant improvement over C2RL, e.g., 2.6 reduction in
CRL size whenM = 10 and p = 10−30.
5.2 Quantitative Analysis
5.2.1 Experimental Setup. Weuse OMNET++ [8] and the Veins
framework to simulate a large-scale scenario using SUMO [14]
with a realistic mobility trace, the LuST dataset [21]. For the cryptogra-
phic protocols and primitives (ECDSA-256 and SHA-256 as per
7Remark: the two false positive rates mentioned here are different in essence; one is
for compressing the CRL entries in C2RL scheme and the another one is for efficiently
validating CRL pieces in our vehicle-centric scheme.
IEEE 1609.2 [10] and ETSI [26]), we use OpenSSL. V2I communi-
cation is IEEE 802.11p8 [3] and cryptographic protocols and prim-
itives were executed on a virtual machine (dual-core 2.0 GHz).
Placement of the RSUs: To effectively place the RSUs [51], we
sorted the intersections with the highest numbers of vehicles pass-
ing by.We then placed the RSUs based on these ‘‘highly-visited’’ in-
tersections (preferablywith non-overlapping radio ranges of RSUs).
Metrics:Weevaluate the latency to obtain the latest CRL pieces,
i.e., from the time a vehicle enters the system until it successfully
downloads them (protocols 2 to 4). We choose a small amount
of bandwidth (B) for the distribution, e.g., 10-50 KB/s, in order
not to interfere with safety-critical operations. Note that request-
triggered CRL piece broadcasts at 10-50 KB/s (80-400 Kbit/s) are
practical because 802.11p supports data-rates up to 24 Mbit/s [3].
Table 2 shows the simulation parameters; Tables 3 and 4 show
the simulation information for the LuST dataset with respect to
different pseudonyms lifetimes (τP ), revocation rates (R), and max-
imum bandwidth for distributing CRL pieces (B). We assume that
the revocation events are uniformly distributed over a day. For
example, if τP = 60s , the total number of pseudonyms for one
day is around 1.7M. Assuming 1% of the pseudonyms are revoked9
(R =1%), there will be around 17K revoked pseudonyms in a day.
With our vehicle-centric approach, each vehicle only needs to ob-
tain pieces of information for the interval it travels. When ΓCRL =
1 hour, the average number of entries per ΓCRL is around 710. As-
suming B is up to 10 KB/s, total number of pieces will be 6.10
5.2.2 Summary of Results. Our vehicle-centric scheme converges
more than 40 times faster than the state-of-the-art [38, 39, 49],
termed here the baseline scheme, with a similar experimental set
up (Fig. 7.b). Moreover, with the baseline scheme, the number of
vehicles that successfully downloaded the latest CRL, referred to as
cognizant vehicles, is highly dependent on the revocation rate and
it significantly drops when the revocation rate increases from 0.5%
to 5%. However, the performance of our scheme is not affected by
the revocation rate: the number of cognizant nodes remains almost
intact even if the revocation rate increases up to 5% (Fig. 8). Fur-
thermore, our scheme is more resilient to pollution and DoS/DDoS
attacks: with 25% of vehicles in the baseline system compromised,
one could prevent almost all legitimate vehicles from obtaining
the CRLs; however, with our scheme, the percentage of informed
vehicles remains almost intact even if 50% of the vehicles are com-
promised (Fig. 9). Moreover, our scheme outperforms the baseline
scheme in terms of computation overhead: signing and verifying
100 CRL pieces for the baseline scheme require 51 ms and 39 ms,
8Our setup is in-line with the deployment of VC systems, with sparse deployment of
RSUs and IEEE 802.1p for safety critical applications [28]. Furthermore, the US De-
partment of Transportation supports Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC)
to distribute CRL updates (∆-CRLs), even though a full CRL update cannot be sup-
ported as the download time might be longer than the average trip duration [1]. Al-
though Cellular-V2X could be an alternative communication technology, it is not cost-
effective (compared to deploying DSRC+Long Term Evolution (LTE)) [1, 9] and it is
far behind in the deployment phase [28]. Our experiment is orthogonal to the choice
of communication, even though it is envisioned to combine both technologies [11, 28].
9To the best of our knowledge, no statistic is available for the expected percentage of
revoked pseudonyms in VC systems. However, ‘‘Let’s Encrypt’’, as one of the largest
CAs in the Internet, reports around 0.2% of revoked certificates [7]. Note that in VC
systems, vehicles are to be providedwith multiple, possibly hundreds, of pseudonyms.
10These numbers come from the actual implementation of encoded packets. Each CRL
piece contains different fields including version, index, total number of pieces in each
ΓCRL , and the entries, serialized with the C++ boost library.
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Figure 5: (a) End-to-end latency to fetch CRL pieces.
(b) Percentage of cognizant vehicles over time.
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Figure 6: (a) Average end-to-end delay to download CRLs. (b)
Dissemination of CRL fingerprints.
respectively; however, for our scheme, signature and verification
delay for 100 CRL pieces is 1 and 12 ms, respectively (Fig. 10.a). Fi-
nally, our experiments confirm that our scheme outperforms the
baseline scheme in terms of communication overhead, and notably
security overhead (Fig. 10.b).
5.2.3 Vehicle-Centric Performance Evaluation. Fig. 5.a shows the
CDF of end-to-end latencies to obtain the needed CRL. For exam-
ple, with τP = 60s , 95% of the vehicles received the needed pieces
in 15s. Fig. 5.b shows the percentage of cognizant vehicles over
time, i.e., those that successfully obtained the CRL pieces. Obvi-
ously, the longer the pseudonym lifetime is, the shorter the CRL
size is, thus the faster the convergence time becomes. For exam-
ple, the percentage of cognizant nodes at system time 50 sec, with
pseudonym lifetime 30s and 600s, is 39% and 76%, respectively.
Fig. 6.a shows the average end-to-end delay to download the
CRL as a function of the number of RSUs for our scheme. The de-
lays were averaged over vehicles operating during the rush hours.
The total number of pseudonyms is 1.7M (τP = 60s) and the max-
imum bandwidth to distribute CRL pieces is 25 KB/s. In general,
a higher number of RSUs and a lower revocation rate result in a
lower average delay to obtain the CRL. For example, the average
latency, with R =1%, decreases from 6.91 to 6.23 as the number of
RSUs increases from 25 to 100. As Fig. 6.a shows, leveraging the
car-to-car epidemic CRL distribution makes the deployment of a
large number of RSUs unnecessary. The optimal number of RSUs
to be deployed for a given domain can be properly determined to
achieve a certain level of quality of service. Further discussion is
beyond the scope of our work.
Fig. 6.b shows how fast a CRL fingerprint is distributed: the
signed fingerprint of CRL pieces is periodically broadcasted only
by RSUs [60], or they are broadcasted by RSUs (approx. 365 bytes
with TX = 5s) and, in addition, integrated into a subset of pseu-
donyms with 36 bytes of extra overhead (p = 10−30, R = 0.5%).
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Figure 7: End-to-end delay to fetch CRLs (R = 1%, τP = 60s).
Obviously, the distribution of CRL fingerprints with our scheme is
faster when there is a small fraction of vehicles with reliable con-
nectivity. However, there is a time lag from the time a PCA releases
CRL fingerprints until practically all vehicles are informed about a
new CRL-update event. Depending on the percentage of vehicles
with reliable connectivity and the frequency of revocation events,
the PCA could ‘‘predict’’ a suitable time to reveal the CRL finger-
print to ensure that every legitimate vehicle operating within the
system would receive the CRL fingerprint. For example, the PCA
could integrate in a fraction of the recently issued pseudonyms the
fingerprint of the current ΓCRL and integrate in another fraction of
newly issued pseudonyms the fingerprint of the subsequent ΓCRL .
5.2.4 Performance Comparison. We compare our scheme with
the baseline scheme [38, 39, 49] that uses RSUs and car-to-car epi-
demic distribution, with the same assumptions, configuration, and
system parameters. For the baseline scheme, the CA signs each
CRL piece and can specify a ‘‘time interval’’ so that each vehicle
receivesD pseudonyms during the pseudonym acquisition process.
As a result, for each batch of revoked pseudonyms, a single si (256
bit) is disclosed. Similarly, the PCA in our scheme can be config-
ured to issue D pseudonyms per Γ, i.e., D =
Γ
τP
. To revoke a batch
of D pseudonyms, the serial number of the first revoked pseudo-
nym in the chain and a random number, each 256 bits long, are
disclosed. For both schemes, we assume a fully-unlinkable pseudo-
nym provisioning policy [45], i.e., Γ = τP = 1min.
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We further assume that vehicles are providedwith enough pseu-
donyms corresponding to their actual trips for a day. Upon a revo-
cation event, information on all revoked pseudonyms for the day is
disseminated for the baseline scheme. In contrast, with our scheme,
the CRL entries are distributed in a time prioritized manner, i.e., re-
voked pseudonyms whose validity intervals fall within the current
ΓCRL . Moreover, by disseminating signed BF in advance, the ver-
ification cost is minimal compared to baseline signature verifica-
tion, i.e., zero delay to verify the BF integrated in fingerprint-carrier
pseudonyms or one signature verification for all CRL pieces.
Fig. 7.a shows the number of cognizant vehicles over time for
the baseline and our scheme. Vehicle-centric distribution of the
CRL pieces converges faster: the number of cognizant vehicles is
very close to the actual number of vehicles in the system. Fig. 7.b
shows the CDF of delays for the two schemes: for the baseline,
Fx (t = 626s) = 0.95, whereas with our scheme, Fx (t = 15s) = 0.95,
11We aim to stress the system with even an impractical configuration. The perfor-
mance of the two schemes would improve if the system is configured with more con-
servative parameters, e.g., Γ = 10τP (10 pseudonyms per Γ). But we want to ensure
that even under the most demanding condition our vehicle-centric scheme remains
practical.
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Figure 8: Cognizant vehicles with different revocation rates.
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Figure 9: Resilience comparison against pollution and DDoS
attacks with different number of attackers in the system.
i.e., converging more than 40 times faster. The principal reasons for
such significant improvements are the prioritization of the revoca-
tion entries based on their validity intervals, thus a huge reduction
in size, as well as the efficient verification of CRL pieces.
Fig. 8.a shows the number of informed vehicles with different
revocation rates (R) for the baseline scheme. The number of cog-
nizant vehicles is highly affected by R: the number of informed
vehicles drops by half when R increases from 0.5% to 3%. Inter-
estingly, the number of cognizant vehicles with R = 5% is practi-
cally negligible, i.e., the majority of vehicles cannot obtain the CRL
pieces within their trip duration because of the huge CRL size. As-
sume that the total number of pseudonyms is T and all system con-
figuration parameters are identical. For the baseline scheme, the
size of the CRL, T × R, linearly increases with R. On the contrary,
Fig. 8.b shows that our scheme is not affected by R: the number
of cognizant vehicles grows as fast as the total number of vehicles
in the system. The PCA classifies the revocation entries based on
ΓCRL intervals; thus, the size of an effective CRL is
T × R
|ΓCRL |
, where
|ΓCRL | is the number of intervals in a day, e.g., |ΓCRL | is 24 when
ΓCRL = 1 hour. This results in a huge reduction in CRL size, thus
ensuring much faster CRLs distribution.
Fig. 9 shows the percentage of cognizant vehicles when attack-
ers perform pollution and DDoS attacks by periodically broadcast-
ing fake CRL pieces once every 0.5s. Fig. 9.a shows that the baseline
scheme is adversely affected once the number of attackers in the
system is more than 10% of the vehicles. In contrast, Fig. 9.b illus-
trates the percentage of cognizant vehicles for our scheme: even
if 50% of the OBUs are compromised and misbehave in this way,
the percentage of cognizant vehicles is not considerably affected
and it still converges within a reasonable delay. Again, such re-
siliency stems from intelligent partitioning of the CRL, yielding a
huge reduction in the CRL size. By integrating the BF of a CRL in
the pseudonyms, we achieve an efficient verification of CRL pieces.
Fig. 10.a compares the computation delays for generating and
validating CRL pieces for the baseline and our schemes. Signing
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Figure 10: (a) Computation latency comparison. (b) Security
overhead comparison, averaged every 30s (R=1%, B = 50KB/s).
and verification delays for the baseline scheme linearly increase
with the number of CRL pieces. For example, signing and verifying
100 pieces of CRL require 51 ms and 39 ms, respectively. Depend-
ing on the frequency of revocation events and the size of a CRL,
this could incur extra overhead for the PCA and the vehicles. But
the verification delay for our scheme moderately increases with
the number of CRL pieces thanks to the lightweight BF member-
ship validation. The delay to sign the CRL pieces is constant (1
ms), in fact one signature for the BF of pieces to be broadcasted via
RSUs and zero additional delay for integrating the fingerprints of
CRL pieces to a subset of pseudonyms during the pseudonym ac-
quisition phase; overall, a significant computational improvement
is achieved.
Fig. 10.b shows the security overhead due to signatures and fin-
gerprints for CRL pieces, for the baseline and the vehicle-centric
scheme respectively. The ECDSA signature size for the baseline
scheme is 72 bytes per piece; the fingerprint in our scheme, 365
bytes long, is signed and it is broadcasted once every 5s via RSUs,
and also integrated in a subset of pseudonyms, 36 bytes (p = 10−30).
Obviously, attaching a pseudonym to every CAM is not practical as
the packet overhead increases. To reduce overhead, a pseudonym
can be attached to CAMs every α (certificate period) and if there is
a pseudonym update process, the new pseudonym is attached ev-
ery system parameter β (push period) [18]. We configure α = 10
and β = 1 with beaconing frequency γ = 0.1 (10 CAM/sec) and
τP = 60s . Fig. 10.b shows that the average security overhead (only
the signature field) for the baseline scheme is higher than the one
for our scheme, even with 20% of nodes assumed as fingerprint-
carriers. Obviously, the longer the pseudonym lifetime, combined
with slow neighborhood change, the lower the need to attach pseu-
donyms, and thus the lower the communication fingerprints over-
head. All in all, our scheme outperforms the baseline scheme in
terms of computation and communication overhead.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We proposed a practical framework to effectively distribute CRLs
in VC systems. Through extensive experimental evaluation, we
demonstrated that our scheme is highly efficient and scalable, re-
silient against DoS attacks, and it is a viable solution towards cat-
alyzing the deployment of the secure and privacy-protecting VC
systems. As future work, we plan to investigate an optimal inter-
val for ΓCRL based on different factors, e.g., the frequency of revo-
cation events, to guarantee a narrower vulnerability window.
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